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Abstract 
Sporadic Nike- Apache vehicle flight failures were viewed with concern prior 
to the first flight of the Nike boosted Aerobee 350 vehicle. The ensuing failure 
study, incorporating afunctional sequence approach to reliability finally assessed 
the Nike malfunctions as induced by combustion instability and the "delta p" ap- 
proach is advanced as a result. 
Nike assembly precautions were taken to avoid combustion instability failure 
modes as pinpointed by this "delta p" hypothesis. On June 18, 1965, the first 
attempt by GSFC to launch the complete Aerobee 350 sounding rocket was a total 
success. 
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A NIKE FAILURE STUDY 
On 20 July 1963, six Nike Apache vehicles were launched in a sounding rocket 
eclipse program at Fort Churchill. The first two failed in flight at about the 
burnout time of the first (Nike) stage. The others went on to provide excellent 
information about the sun and ionosphere. 
This report presents the findings from an investigation of these and similar 
motor failures. 
The failures were significant for  two reasons. The first obviously reflected 
on the unreliability of reputedly reliable motors. The other concerned the use of 
a Nike booster for the Aerobee 350 sustainer under development at the time. 
Fortunately, parts of one of the failed units were recovered. The two units 
which failed were  serial numbers 44098 and 44100. As a lead to understanding 
the nature of the two Nike failures, it was assumed that serial number 44099 
would also contain the unknown failure mode because of some faulty assembly 
procedure common to all three. Rocket motors S/N 44097 and 44101 had flown 
successfully as did many of the other units within this particular Radford lot, 
RAD- SR- 1 1-62. 
The failure study was then conducted against the Nike life cycle background 
of: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7.  
8. 
rocket motor design 
development program 
production 
assembly 
delivery (storage and handling) 
prelaunch inspection 
launch attempt 
recovered parts examination 
The rocket motor design was reviewed employing the functional sequence 
approach (1). By considering the function of each component of the motor in 
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sequential order (Appendix A), possible modes of failure could be identified 
(Appendix B) and would serve as critical inspection points during motor assembly. 
An attempt w a s  made to uncover past trouble areas which might have oc- 
curred during the original Nike development program, and which might be re- 
peating as failure modes. However, no comprehensive report was to be found 
summarizing all the problems faced in developing the Nike although the Alleghany 
Ballistic Laboratory at Cumberland, Maryland, was consulted for  this purpose. 
A visit was made to Radford Arsenal, Virginia, to develop a greater famil- 
iarity with present Nike production methods and techniques so as to better 
understand Radford's quality control effort. 
With the interest engendered as indicated above in Nike unit, S/N 44099, 
arrangements were made to inspect this unit in terms of an inspection plan 
prepared by Radford (Appendix C).  
Thumba Rocket Launching site in Trivandrum, India. 
country, the exterior of the wooden container indicated it had received rough 
handling. Here then was a unit which had gone half way around the world and had 
aroused a high degree of curiosity as to its condition, especially since it might 
possibly contain an assembly faux pas common to the two units which had failed 
at C hurc hill. 
This unit meanwhile had traveled to  the 
When returned to this 
Concurrent with these plans, a "Rocket Failure Study Chart - Nike 
2.5DS59.000" was developed to list all possible modes of failure as they evolved 
during the study (Appendix D). Additional possible modes of failure, as un- 
covered, were entered on this chart. 
Upon disassembly and inspection of the S/N 44099 unit, the following dis- 
crepancies and possible indications of modes of failure were noted: 
1. three inadequately torqued resonance rods; they were not finger-tight 
2. grain undercut at the forward end: possibly reducing the structural 
integrity of the grain near burnout 
3. poorly applied sealing compound at the aft end of the grain (in the 1 1 : O O  
position of Figure 1) : possibly permitting leakage (and flow) of otherwise 
stationary hot gases to the aft end of the motor along the insulation 
coated metal wall. 
The composite photograph, Figure 1, may help to  show the various stages of 
disassembly of the S 'N 44099 unit along with the noted discrepancies. Sequentially 
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Figure 1 
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it shows the forward head as removed (photo #l), then the removal of the shipping 
plug (replaced by the igniter prior to firing), the snap ring, and the spring which 
immobilizes the propellant grain (photo #2),  the resonance rod assembly partially 
withdrawn from the grain (photo #3),  the undercut forward end of the grain (photo 
#4), the template paper to protect the flamastic coating during grain loading and 
conveniently slide the propellant grain into the chamber case (photo #5), views of 
the sealing compound, as  found, applied to the aft end of the grain (photos #7 and 
# 8 ) ,  a portion of the sealing compound removed to determine whether the uncham- 
fired chill ring had cut into the aft end of the grain* (photo 9), and the nozzle 
closure with electrical harness (photo # lo ) .  
To complete the S/N 44099 unit assessment, the original grain was satis- 
factorily static fired in a heavy wall test chamber motorcase. The 44099 unit, 
with a new replacement grain, then performed satisfactorily on NASA flight 
12.02 G T  (a  boosted dummy Aerobee 350 sustainer). 
~ 
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A s  a result of this disassembly and inspection, it was found necessary to 
update the quality control for the resonance rod assembly to: 
1. Replace the now obsolete rubber grommet specification with that for the 
Belleville springs. 
2. Properly torque the nuts of Ordnance Corps Drawing 8025087 so that 
the Belleville springs are under adequate compression. 
Metallurgical examination of the recovered chamber remnants of one of the 
units indicated (2)  that I'the steel w a s  dirty as shown by the amount of inclusions 
present in the structure. These inclusions could serve as stress risers and 
become failure initiation sites.I' These inclusions or ffstringers'f tended to reduce 
the homogeneity and strength of the steel. 
At this point in time, the Rocket Failures Study Chart led to the Nike booster 
defects contribution theory, Figure 2. This theory assumes the probability of 
failure of a Nike unit is a product of the probability of Occurrence of each of the 
possible failure modes ( P t  x l ,  x2, x3, - - ). During tailoff, it w a s  assumed 
that gas leaking past the seal compound, combustion instability arising from 
loose resonance rods, high g forces of sounding rockets, and grain undercutting 
by the unchamfired chill ring and the resonance rod spider would all tend to 
weaken the grain structure. 
* I t  had not done so. 
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NlKE BOOSTER DEFECTS CONTRIBUTION THEORY 
( Pf = xp2x3 ... ) 
DURING TAILOFF 
GAS LEAKING COMBUSTION HIGH G FORCES 9-b UNDERCUT - 
PAST SEAL INSTABILITY 
COMPOUND FROM LOOSE 
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Figure 2 
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Later, on 24 November 1964, a first  stage Nike M-5 malfunctioned after 
approximately 1.4 seconds of flight of a Nike Javelin at Eglin AFB (3) .  It was 
possible to recover the f i rs t  stage fin assembly, a f ew pieces of the motor case, 
the M-5 nozzle, the interstage, the Nike head cap, and approximately 300 to 400 
pounds of propellant. The situation here reminded one of the two Nike failures 
at Fort Churchill in July 1963. On investigating the November 1964 malfunction, 
it was concluded (3), on the basis of rippled grain surface evidence, that unstable 
burning had occurred in some of the channel chambers of the multi-channeled 
single grain. This observation has led to the "delta p" approach to combustion 
instability (Appendix E). 
In preparation for the first series of flight tests of the complete Aerobee 
350 sounding vehicle (17.01 - 17.04), a total of four Nike units were then disas- 
sembled and inspected. Inspection results of these units and the previous 
S/N 44099 are shown on Table 1. It would seem that the four motors had been 
previously disassembled and reassembled at Umatilla (Ordnance Depot, Hermi- 
ston, Oregon) without the quality control and assembly equipment available at 
Radford. As a result, the template paper had not been properly installed, the 
seal compound was dry, and three of the four grains were delaminated. The 
improperly installed template paper and dry seal compound would undoubtedly 
have created gas leakage problems. Grain delaminations would also have lead 
to possible Nike blowups. 
After appropriate hole pattern modification of each of the four chamber 
cases for adaptation to Aerobee 350, the four grains were replaced by new ones 
(PR 47448) and reassembled in accordance with Radford quality control. 
On 18 June 1965, the first attempt by GSFC to launch the complete Aerobee 
350 sounding rocket was a total success. (4). The Nike boost motor had operated 
faultlessly. 
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ADDendix A 
TO : Flight Performance Section Files DATE: 22 April 1965 
FROM : Mr.  Abrom Hisler 
Flight Performance Section 
SUBJECT : THE FUNCTIONAL SEQUENCE APPROACH TO N E E  
RELIABILITY 
REFERENCE : Sounding Rocket Reliability Reassessment, A. Hisler, NASA 
TN D-2222, NOV. 1964, p. 4 
Use of the necessary sequence of events to run down modes of failure was 
suggested in Appendix €3 of the above reference. Its applic&.tioE to the Nike solid 
propellant rocket motor was attempted and will be here presented. 
"The Nike Motor Components' Assembly", Attachment A, was  prepared to 
develop the necessary level of familiarity. "A Functional Sequence of Nike 
Motor Operation", Attachment B, also attached, then followed. With the latter 
attachment, it is then possible to attempt to relate inspection findings and flight 
mishaps (see attached Inspection at  Radford Arsenal of Nike Boosters for Aero- 
bee 350 Vehicles, Table I). 
Applicable functional sequence stages of Attachment B will be considered. 
8. The Wallops procedure of opening the hermetic sealed cans and then 
taping them closed may introduce moisture at this point and possibly prevent 
igniter charge ignition. 
10. Grain delaminations and blemishes may produce an excessive burning 
surface area to bring on a blow. 
l l (a) .  It is assumed that the resonance rods must vibrate properly to reduce 
local pressure gradients within the motor. Otherwise there will be uneven 
burning of the propellant to produce local hot spots and finally motor gas leakage 
at these points. If the resonance rods are  not properly torqued, it is again as- 
sumed they cannot vibrate properly. 
ll(b). Leakage at the forward end of the motor is avoided by the O-ring 
(8025016) and the gasket (8025103). 
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12(a). Leakage at the aft end of the motor must be avoided to prevent recir- 
culation of combustion gases past the seam sealing compound (MIL-P-8116). 
Such gas circulation would erode the grain beaker and create local hot spots 
past the flamastic coating. There would be a race between this beaker erosion 
to create critical burning surface areas and eventual over-pressurization, and 
local heating to burn a hole through the motor body (8030044) leading to com- 
bustion gas leakage and eventual flame extinguishment. 
To avcid the above, i t  is necessary that the seam sealing compound be uni- 
formly applied. No dried sealing compound can be tolerated, and the template 
paper must not be allowed to "bunch up" at the aft end of the grain to act as a 
very unsatisfactory seal. 
The flamastic coating may not stand up too well with time as loose flamastic 
coatings were noted on a ten year old motor. 
Abrom Hisler 
NIKE MOTOR COMPONENTS' ASSEMBLY - ATTACHMENT A 
By referring to the appropriate drawing (Ordnance Corps., Dept. of the Army, 
Redstone Arsenal) it is possible to readily follow the steps of Nike motor 
assembly. 
1. XM69 Igniter (8031024) - This igniter replaces the M24 and M65 
igniters. 
The igniter cartridge (8031023) is assembled to the igniter head 
(8025059) via six washers (8025045), 2 nuts (MS 35649-62), and two 
self-locking nuts (MS 2-365-632A) 
The igniter cartridge (8031023) is hermetically sealed and consists 
of the 
1) cup (8031021) with two external connections with shorting wire  
prior to use 
2) cap (8031022) 
The cup (8031021) and cap (8031022) as a unit contain the explosive 
composition and internal wiring harness (8021026) 
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The internal wiring harness (8031026) lead out thru the igniter head 
(8025059) to the igniter harness assembly (8025066) attached to the 
igniter head (8025059) via the spring clip (8034509). Electrical 
wiring leads from the igniter harness assembly (8025066) thru one 
pressure sealed connection on the head assembly (8025012) to the 
interior of the rocket motor assembly. The harness assembly 
(803004) continues the electrical circuit from the inside of the head 
assembly (8025012) through the grain (8025090) thru the nozzle 
closure assembly (8030041) to permit igniter initiation frcm the aft 
end of the motor. 
2. Jntegral nozzle-chamber body (803004) - Motor assembly is performed 
within this body after the flamastic coating has been applied and suitably 
dried. It consists of the following steps: 
Insertion of template paper to protect the flamastic coating and re- 
duce the coefficient of friction as the grain is slid into the chamber 
(8030044). 
Insertion of the grain (8025090) after uniformly applying the seam 
sealing compound (Specification MIL-P-8116) and taping existing 
holes in the forward end of the body (8030044) 
Thread harness assembly (8030004) thru grain and secure to nozzle 
closure assembly (8030041) previously assembled to nozzle in a) 
above 
Insertion of resonance rod assembly (8025087) after properly 
torquing each of the nine resonance rods finger-tight 
Mounting the spring (8025098) with the large base contacting the 
resonance rod assembly (8025087) 
Pressing the head assembly (8025012) against the spring (8025098) 
after connecting the harness assembly (8030004) to the underside 
of the head assembly (8025012) electrical connector and after re- 
moving the tape over the holes in the forward end of the body 
(8030044), and after assembly of the lubricated "0" ring (8025016) 
to the head assembly (8025012) 
Fix the snap ring (8025082) in position and release the pressure on 
the head assembly (8025012) 
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h) Assemble gasket (8025103) followed by shipping closure (8025014) 
to head assembly (8025012) 
i) Prior to use, the XM69 igniter (8031024) replaces the shipping 
closure (8025014) but the gasket (8025103) remains 
A FUNCTIONAL SEQUENCE OF NIKE MOTOR OPERATION 
ATTACHMENT B 
1. Electrical firing pulse 
2. Thru harness external to motor 
3. Thru harness assembly (8030004) 
4. From inside to  outside of head assembly (8025012) 
5. To harness assembly (8025066) 
6. To igniter cartridge (8031023) 
7. Thru internal wiring harness (8031026) 
8. To explosive composition (Note 2, 8031023) 
9. Ignition of igniter charge 
10. Initiate burning at surface of grain (8025090) 
11. Generate combustion gases 
a) within grain 
b) at forward and aft end of motor 
12 ,  Travel of combustion gases 
a) to position between grain beaker and flamastic coating of motor 
body (803004) 
b) toward nozzle and out 
1 2  
Appendix B 
POSSIBLE MODES OF FAILURE/FUNCTIONAL SEQUENCE APPROACH 
1.  Electrical continuity/continuity check 
2. Proper combustion gas sealing in terms of: 
a) O-ring (8025016) 
b) Gasket (8025103) 
c) Uniform application of seam sealing compound (MIL-P-8116) 
d) Proper use of template paper to avoid the sealing mode of failure 
e) No leakage past the electrical connection and pressure tap in the 
head assembly (8025012)/hydrostatic test 
3. No grain delamination or  anomaly 
4. Properly torqued resonance rods; use of Belleville springs 
5. Spring force within specified limits 
To better understand the above critical items, reference to the Redstone 
Arsenal general assembly drawing no. 8030045 of the M-5 Nike rocket motor is 
suggested. 
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SCOPE OF WORK 
INSPECTION OF A NASA NIKE ROCKET MOTOR FROM LOT RAD SR-11-62 
The purpose of this inspection procedure is to determine if any condition or  
combination of conditions exist which couid cause the r,a?fmction of a Nike 
Rocket motor. This program shall utilize one M-5 Nike Rocket motor and shall 
consist of the following phases. 
1. Visual. Dimensional. and Electrical Inspections 
a) Prior to opening the shipping and storage container, the exterior of 
the container will be Whspected for the following: 
1) Evidence of structural damage 
2) Condition of the M24 igniter 
b) Upon removal of the M-5 Rocket Motor from the container, the 
following inspections will be made: 
1) Evidence of damage to the rocket motor 
2) Hydrostatic test stamp missing 
c )  The M-5 unit will be disassembled and the following measurements 
and inspections will be made during or after disassembly: 
1) Propellant grain immobilizer spring improperly positioned 
2 )  Resonance rod assembly improperly installed 
3) Seam sealing compound missing 
4) Flamemastic coating chipped o r  cracked 
5) Condition of motor head t tO"  ring 
d) The M-5 propellant grain will be inspected for the following: 
1) Inhibitor or propellant cut, gouged, or damaged 
15 
2 .  
3. 
2) 
3) Inhibitor delamination 
The metal parts will be inspected for the following: 
Defective bonding of propellant and inhibitor 
e) 
Brinell hardness test on the motor chamber, motor head, and 
resonance rod support plate 
Compression strength of immobilizer spring 
Diameter of nozzle throat 
Major outside diameter of head 
Width and thickness of snap ring 
Diameter of snap ring groove in head 
Diameter of r c O r r  ring groove 
Inside diameter of forward end of motor body 
Depth of snap ring groove in motor body 
Hydrostatic Test of Motor Chamber and Head 
The M-5 motor chamber and head will be hydrostatically tested at a 
pressure of 1625 (+50 -0) psig for a minimum of three minutes. 
Reconditioning and Reloading for Shipment 
a) Reconditioning of metal parts 
1) The inside of the M-5 chamber will be coated with Flamemas- 
tic 
2 )  The metal parts will be cleaned and painted 
b) The M-5 Rocket motor will be reloaded, utilizing i ts  original 
components, and will be held for shipping instructions. 
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Appendix E 
THE "delta P'' APPROACH TO COMBUSTION INSTABILITY 
At the operating chamber pressure regime of a solid propellant rocket motor, 
it is assumed that the ratio of inertial to viscous forces plays a decisive role in 
determining the magnitude of the effective throat area. 
Where this ratio is sufficiently high, the effective throat area approaches the 
design value. Where it is low, swirl flow is assumed to exist at the nozzle throat. 
In this respect, Swithenbank (1) has suggested "that the effect of swir l  on nozzle 
flow is the predominant factor in the severe irregular burning that arises from 
traveling tangential modes---". 
If the inertial/viscous forces ratio is too low, then instability prevails. Here 
it is further assumed that there is a periodic weight accumulation of gases in the 
free volume of the solid motor chamber so that the weight rate of flow of gases 
discharged through the exhaust nozzle also varies periodically (2). The weight 
rate of propellant consumption remains constant for  the most par t  but does reflect 
increments in the chamber pressure. 
With the effective throat area less than the design value, and the weight rate 
of gases in the free volume increasing, the chamber pressure increases to 
generally improve the mixing of combustion gases within the chamber. This 
changes the heat transfer pattern within the chamber to increase heat transfer 
toward and past the nozzle throat. In effect, annular layers of swir l  flow at the 
throat are sheared off until the minimum pressure value for a particular pres- 
sure  cycle is reached and the motor then momentarily operates at near design 
value of the throat area. Once this has occurred, the chamber pressure again 
rises as the swirl condition returns to again reduce the effective throat area and 
the cycle starts anew. 
To maintain an adequate effective throat area so that the rate of gas dis- 
charge equals the rate of gas generation, additional energy must be provided so 
that the required inertial/viscous ratio is maintained. One suggested approach 
is to increase the pressure drop across the length of the motor by either in- 
creasing the pressure in the forward end of the chamber and/or reducing the 
pressure in the aft end of the chamber. In this respect, gas leakage in the for- 
ward end of the Nike motor, past the seal compound, may very well have reduced 
the pressure drop across the length of the chamber to the point where it caused 
combustion instability in that duct of the propellant grain where the rate of com- 
bustion gas accumulation was greatest. Another way to provide this additional 
energy is to inject a relatively higher velocity central core stream at the forward 
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end of the chamber. The latter concept has been incorporated into the "purge 
motor", designed to purge combustion chambers of their instability. This motor 
is presently under patent application study. 
In either case, it is assumed that the pressure drop (delta p) across the 
length of the chamber has been increased and hence the "delta p" approach. 
The inertial/viscous force ratio, of course, is nothing more than the Reynolds 
number where the critical value is assumed to lie at the upper portion of the 
transition zone between laminar and turbulent flow. The above may be more than 
conjecture; a recent parametric study of rocket instability has found various 
types of Reynolds number similarity parameters to be significant (3).  
Although the linear velocity corresponds to a Mach of 1 at the throat, and 
this velocity in the ''x" direction can be assumed to be constant during combus- 
tion instability, the "y" and "z" orthogonal components of velocity do vary. With 
increasing chamber pressure during combustion instability, the resultant velocity 
may be increased slightly above a critical value during a pressure cycle to 
change the flow regime. A decided jump in the level of turbulence would then 
change the heat transfer pattern as suggested above to reduce swirl flow at the 
throat with the attendant increase in effective throat area and subsequent re- 
duction in chamber pressure. 
The above suggests that combustion instability is simply an instance of 
intermittent turbulence where the necessary turbulence level is not maintained. 
Intermittent turbulence occurs at a specific head where transitionsbetween 
laminar and turbulent flow continue indefinitely (4). 
If combustion stability is indeed a special case of intermittent turbulence, 
then raising the head (delta p) across the length of the chamber should bypass 
this intermittent happenstance. 
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